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I. INTRODUCTION 
Open a course catalog at most law schools in the country, and you 
will find a course called “Constitutional Law.”  If you happen to take that 
course, as indeed you must at most of these law schools, you will find 
one thing more—that it teaches just one side of the story, focusing on the 
Federal Constitution, rarely mentioning, if mentioning at all, the 
constitutions of the fifty states. 
Why is that?  In one sense, the most essential sense, state 
constitutional law is no less a form of American constitutional law than 
federal constitutional law.  State constitutions, like the Federal 
Constitution, provide a blueprint for government, allocating authority 
among the branches of power, establishing the terms of office, and 
defining the terms of consent.  State constitutions, no less than the 
Federal Constitution, thus establish charters of government that 
simultaneously empower and constrain: that set forth the rules for 
regulating the people of a state and limit this authority through liberty, 
property, structural, and other guarantees.  In this sense, state 
constitutional law parallels federal constitutional law, doing everything 
the Federal Constitution does, just on a smaller scale. 
Just?  The difference between the size of the territories covered by 
the one constitution and the other fifty no doubt helps to explain why 
state constitutional law is taken less seriously, why some might even ask 
whether state constitutional law amounts to “constitutional law” at all.  
But does scale alone provide the answer?  Some state constitutions after 
all cover massive territories and populations themselves.  In population, 
California would be the thirty-fourth largest country in the world,1 and 
                                                     
*   Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
 1. See Country Comparison: Population, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2011), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html; State & 
County Quickfacts: California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/ 
06000.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
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Texas, whose people do not take this kind of thing lightly, would be the 
forty-eighth largest country in the world.2  Taken together, more to the 
point, the fifty constitutions cover all of the land mass and population 
covered by the United States Constitution, save for a few territories and a 
conspicuous district, providing a second set of constitutional powers and 
constraints that touch nearly every American. 
Scale, then, must be a partial answer, not a complete one.  Else, the 
greatest constitution of all might be the Charter of the United Nations.  
Scale alone does not explain why most Americans do not know they live 
in a state with its own constitution.3  It does not explain why so few law 
schools teach state constitutional law.4  Why still fewer of the top-ranked 
law schools teach the subject.5  Why so few states place the topic on their 
bar exams.6  And it does not explain why many newly minted lawyers, 
licensed to practice law by individual states, not the United States, do not 
know what it means when they swear to uphold the Federal Constitution 
and their state constitution.7 
At least four other features of state constitutional law, it seems to me, 
diminish it in the eyes of the legal profession: the undue length of most 
state constitutions; the ease with which they may be amended; the 
election of judges who interpret them; and lockstep interpretations of the 
state constitutions with the Federal Constitution.  The point of this essay 
is to examine each critique—dignifying some, responding to others—and 
to place them all in the broader context of American constitutionalism. 
II. THE CONTENT AND LENGTH OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
As a matter of appearance, state constitutions do not look the part.  
Too many of them are cluttered with provisions having little to do with 
the architecture of government and more to do with the kinds of 
                                                     
 2. See Country Comparison, supra note 1; State & County Quickfacts: Texas, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).  
 3. John Kincaid, State Court Protections of Individual Rights Under State Constitutions: The 
New Judicial Federalism, 61 J. STATE GOV’T 163, 169 (1988); see also Jeffrey S. Sutton, Speech, 
Why Teach—and Why Study—State Constitutional Law, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 165, 169 (2009); 
Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law: Teaching and Scholarship, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 243, 
243 (1991). 
 4. See Sutton, supra note 3, at 166–67. 
 5. See id. at 167. 
 6. See id. at 167–68. 
 7. See E. Norman Veasey, Foreword to RANDY J. HOLLAND, STEPHEN R. MCALLISTER, 
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JEFFREY S. SUTTON, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE MODERN 
EXPERIENCE, at iii (2010). 
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everyday concerns covered by legislation.  First impressions make a 
difference, and a first glance at most state charters suggests a state code, 
not a state constitution.  All state constitutions contain the essentials of 
structure and rights, and a few of them admirably restrict themselves to 
the basics—take the constitutions of Missouri, New Hampshire, and 
Virginia.8  But these few exceptions highlight the norm that most state 
constitutions diminish the essentials of governing by associating them 
with page after page of laws that amount to nothing more than legislation 
dressed up in constitutional garb.  And often exotic legislation at that.  
Consider these state constitutional provisions: obligating the government 
to promote the sale of catfish;9 phasing out the use of gill nets in 
fishing;10 authorizing the operation of four casinos and regulating how 
they must be run, including the parcels of property where they must be 
located;11 mandating “the protection of livestock against the introduction 
or spread of pleuro pneumonia, glanders, splenetic or Texas fever”;12 
addressing the “manner of filling vacancies on the Morgan County Board 
of Education”;13 allowing the legislature to regulate the inspection of 
cattle;14 and providing grounds for divorce.15 
Not just the appearance that state constitutions regulate a remarkable 
array of subjects, but its prosaic reality, lessens state constitutions.  At 
the founding, the average state constitution contained roughly 7000 
words.16  Yet today, state constitutions average 36,000 words in length, 
four times the length of the Federal Constitution.17  The Alabama 
Constitution has 287 sections and 827 amendments,18 and the California 
Constitution has more than 200 sections.19  As of 2010, the states have 
held 233 constitutional conventions and generated more than 7000 
constitutional amendments.20 
                                                     
 8. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Gay Rights and American Constitutionalism: What’s a 
Constitution for?, 56 DUKE L.J. 545, 571 (2006). 
 9. ALA. CONST. amend. 492, § 1. 
 10. CAL. CONST. art. 10B, § 3–5. 
 11. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 6. 
 12. IDAHO CONST. art. XVI, § 1. 
 13. ALA. CONST. amend. 577. 
 14. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 23. 
 15. S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 3. 
 16. HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 7, at 894. 
 17. State Constitutions, TEXAS POLITICS, http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/7_3_1.html (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2011). 
 18. See ALA. CONST., available at http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLogin 
Fire.asp. 
 19. See CAL. CONST., available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/const-toc.html. 
 20. Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences Into Account: Toward a State-
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In contrast to the sparing elegance of the United States Constitution, 
which has generated just twenty-seven amendments and which lacks “the 
prolixity of a legal code,”21 state constitutions look like yard sales, filled 
with items that never should have been included in the first place and 
that obscure the basics of governing.  There seems to be a tendency to 
constitutionalize anything that matters a lot to this or that group, “to 
enshrine every value” they “hold dear,”22 to demonstrate its value by 
establishing that it is protected not just by law but by supreme law.  Yet 
governmental charters that constitutionalize everything run the risk of 
constitutionalizing nothing, of inflating away the value of establishing 
fundamental laws in the first place. 
More than just aesthetics, then, is at risk.  The undiscriminating 
range of topics in most state constitutions runs the risk not just of 
disfiguring them but of undermining the dignity of the charters, of 
leading the legal academy, to say nothing of the public, not to “tak[e] 
state constitutions seriously.”23  No one to my knowledge defends this 
feature of the states’ constitutions.  But there is an explanation. 
III. THE EASE OF AMENDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Most state constitutions look the way they do because their contents 
depend on the restraint of just fifty-one percent of a state’s voters.  In 
contrast to the United States Constitution, which requires three-quarters 
of the states to ratify any proposed change to it, a mere majority of the 
electorate may amend the constitutions of forty-seven states.24  While 
Article V stands sentinel against efforts to change the United States 
Constitution, the majoritarian nature of the states’ amendment 
procedures invites rather than discourages alteration, even in the context 
of guarantees designed to protect the individual from a democratic 
majority. 
What good is a liberty guarantee or a measure designed to protect 
discrete groups of citizens if both are one statewide initiative away from 
                                                                                                                       
Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1640 (2010); see also 
Peter J. Galie & Christopher Bopst, Changing State Constitutions: Dual Constitutionalism and the 
Amending Process, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 27, 52 (1996). 
 21. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
 22. Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 558. 
 23. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 2 (1998); see also Devins, supra 
note 20, at 1642. 
 24. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 2010, at 13 (2011), available 
at http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/drupal/system/files/Table_1.2.pdf [hereinafter BOOK OF THE 
STATES].  The exceptions are the constitutions of Delaware, Florida, and New Hampshire.  Id. 
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being changed by a majority vote?  “Since all state law is reduced to one 
level,” “we no longer have any [state] constitutional law,”25 making state 
constitutional rights “more akin to statutory rights than to constitutional 
constraints.”26  This is not the constitution of Brown v. Board of 
Education,27 and indeed it may be the kind of constitution that made 
Brown necessary.  It is why a leading scholar gives just two, not three, 
cheers for state constitutional law, regretting that “state court decisions 
interpreting the state constitution to advance liberty or equality can be 
undone through the electoral process.”28  And it is central to other 
critiques of state constitutional law.29 
Doubtless, there is something to this “persistent” charge30 that 
constitutions work best when they block changes to their terms, not when 
they facilitate them.  But is the charge overstated or at least worthy of 
examination?  Start with the amendment dilemma.  Setting rules for 
reforming a document meant to last but not to fall into desuetude is no 
easy task.  As Madison acknowledged, one must “guard[] equally against 
that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; 
and the extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered 
faults.”31  It seems unlikely that Jefferson, who thought a constitutional 
convention should be held every twenty years or so,32 would have 
                                                     
 25. Margaret C. Klinglesmith, Amending the Constitution of the United States, 73 U. PA. L. 
REV. 355, 371 (1925); Galie & Bopst, supra note 20, at 29. 
 26. Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1606 
(2010). 
 27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 28. Erwin Chemerinsky, Two Cheers for State Constitutional Law, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 
1701 (2010). 
 29. See, e.g., Galie & Bopst, supra note 20, at 29 (“State modes of constitutional reform are 
usually pointed to as . . . making it too easy to effect constitutional change.”); Marvin Krislov & 
Daniel M. Katz, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 17 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 337–38 
(2008) (“[V]irtually every state requires mere majority support to ratify a constitutional change.”); 
Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions: Legislative 
Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 1475 (1987) 
(“[C]onstitutional law cannot protect individuals from the majority if the majority can (and does) 
refashion constitutional law at will.”); Andrew E. Faust, Comment, Pennsylvania’s Voluntary 
Confession Amendment: Majoritarian Control of Fundamental Rights, 89 DICK. L. REV. 1003, 1027 
(1985) (stating that amending a constitution should “require[] more farsightedness and concern for 
political minorities than legislators usually display in the ordinary course of their majority-bound 
business”). 
 30. Galie and Bopst, supra note 20, at 29. 
 31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 278 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also 
Galie & Bopst, supra note 20, at 27. 
 32. In a letter to Samuel Kercheval, dated July 12, 1816, Jefferson said: 
Let us provide in our Constitution for its revision at stated periods.  What these periods 
should be, nature herself indicates.  By the European tables of mortality, of the adults 
living at any one moment of time, a majority will be dead in about nineteen years.  At the 
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thought that an amendment procedure that has generated just fifteen 
amendments since his generation left us has answered the risk of dead-
hand control.33 
Both the state and federal constitutions, it is well to consider, may 
imperfectly balance the competing interests between reform and stability, 
“between timelessness and timeliness.”34  If the state constitutions are too 
easy to amend, perhaps the Federal Constitution is too hard to amend.35  
While there is much to admire about the steadfastness of a regime in 
which nearly 10,000 proposed amendments have been presented to 
Congress since 1789 and all but twenty-seven of them resisted,36 not 
everyone says a nearly unalterable charter is a virtue.  Some worry that 
provisions have “become[] irrelevant when needed change and 
rectification of mistakes becomes all but impossible” due to the super-
majority requirements for ratification.37  Some worry about the pressure 
placed on the United States Supreme Court to reset the document, to 
make it relevant to modern disputes through interpretation,38 which 
“risks . . . putting a singular power, a Framer’s pen, in the hands of five 
sitting Justices.”39  Some critics, indeed, charge that “[t]he difficulty of 
amending that Constitution has led to a regime dominated by non-Article 
V constitutional change.”40  Others worry that many anti-democratic, but 
clearly worded, features of the United States Constitution make little 
                                                                                                                       
end of that period then, a new majority is come into place, or, in other words, a new 
generation.  Each generation is as independent as the one preceding, as that was of all 
which had gone before.  It has then, like them, a right to choose for itself the form of 
government it believes most promotive of its own happiness; . . . and it is for the peace 
and good of mankind, that a solemn opportunity of doing this every nineteen or twenty 
years, should be provided by the constitution. 
HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 7, at 893. 
 33. After the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, the Eleventh Amendment was ratified in 1798, 
and the Twelfth Amendment was ratified in 1804, no amendments were made until the Civil War 
Amendments in 1865, 1868, and 1870.  See CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: STRUCTURE AND RECONSTRUCTION, at xxxiv–xxxvii (4th ed. 2009). 
 34. Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 
357 (2011). 
 35. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 265 (Sanford 
Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION] (observing that the Federal 
Constitution “is unusually, and probably excessively, difficult to amend”). 
 36. Galie & Bopst, supra note 20, at 32. 
 37. Id. at 28–29. 
 38. Id. at 28; see also 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 47–50 (1991); 
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 
1045, 1067–68 (2001). 
 39. Jeffrey S. Sutton, The Role of History in Judging Disputes About the Meaning of the 
Constitution, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1173, 1180 (2009). 
 40. Galie & Bopst, supra note 20, at 28. 
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sense in modern America, leaving the gauntlet of the amendment or 
convention processes as the only solutions.41 
True or not, these critiques of the Federal Constitution suggest that if 
the amendment procedures of the state constitutions are too democratic, 
that is a flaw of degree, not of kind.  To say that state constitutions are 
too amenable to change is to acknowledge a reality of all constitutions—
that rules for reform are maddeningly difficult—and to acknowledge that 
the state constitutions generally err on one side, but not the only side, of 
the dilemma.42  To the extent the state and federal amendment 
procedures imperfectly balance the competing interests in stability and 
progress, they each err in the right direction.  Far better, it would seem, 
to have a nearly immutable national charter and variable state charters 
than to have the reverse. 
Even granting the full force of the majoritarian critique, the state 
amendment procedures are not monolithic.  Consistent with the 
complexity of the task at hand, the states use a variety of mechanisms, 
some easier than others, yet all of them undermining the notion that there 
is just one path to constitutional reform.43 
The most commonly invoked model of revision is the legislative 
initiative.44  Of all state amendments between 1964 and 1993, legislative 
initiatives prompted ninety percent of them.45  These initiatives typically 
require approval by the state legislature followed by popular 
ratification.46  States generally use legislative initiatives for limited 
changes, and some states prohibit their use for more extensive 
amendment.47  At least three states—Delaware, Florida, and New 
                                                     
 41. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 167–68 (2006) 
(criticizing, among other things, the anti-democratic nature of the electoral college, the non-
proportional representation of U.S. senators, the life tenure of federal judges, and the difficulty of the 
amendment process).  Professor Akhil Amar questions whether a federal constitutional convention 
would demand supermajority approval—suggesting that, at least when it comes to federal and state 
constitutional conventions, both sets of documents may be majoritarian.  See Akhil Reed Amar, 
Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 
35, at 89, 89–90 (noting that a constitutional convention with majority support could amend the 
Federal Constitution). 
 42. See Galie & Bopst, supra note 20, at 32 (“Whereas states have preferred to turn ordinary 
legislation into constitutional amendments, the Congress has preferred to turn potential constitutional 
amendments into legislation.”). 
 43. See id. at 27 (“An examination of the modes of constitutional revision at the state level 
reveals a remarkably diverse and active reform tradition.”). 
 44. Id. at 32. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 32, 34. 
 47. Id. at 34. 
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Hampshire—not unlike the national government, impose supermajority 
requirements on the commencement of legislative initiatives.48  Delaware 
requires two-thirds approval by the legislature in two succeeding 
sessions.49  New Hampshire requires two-thirds approval of the 
legislature, while Florida requires three-fifths approval of it, after which 
each measure goes to the people for a majority vote.50  Delaware stands 
alone in allowing amendments by legislative initiative that do not require 
popular ratification.51 
Of the state amendment procedures, the legislative initiative is not 
only the most frequently used, but it is also “the least controversial” 
because it customarily requires legislative and popular approval, 
ensuring that reforms made this way are “likely to have the support of 
significant political forces in the state.”52  At least when it comes to this 
procedure, no one can say that it takes the same effort to amend the 
constitution as it does to change a statute—that state constitutional law 
and state legislation are one. 
Constitutional conventions, generally used to achieve system-wide 
reform, account for the second highest number of amendments.53  While 
the national government has not held a constitutional convention since 
1787, the states have held more than 230 as of 2009.54  In all states, a 
majority or supermajority vote determines whether the work of a 
constitutional convention will become law.55  Fourteen states even 
require that the electorate periodically be given a chance to vote—again 
by a majority56—on whether to convene a new constitutional 
convention.57 
Despite concerns about runaway conventions or capture by single-
interest groups, “[a]n examination of the proposals originating from these 
conventions provide[s] little or no support for the view that state 
constitutional conventions constitute a danger to the values that comprise 
the American constitutional tradition.”58  “‘The empirical evidence . . . 
                                                     
 48. Id. at 32. 
 49. Id. 
 50. BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 24, at 13. 
 51. See Galie & Bopst, supra note 20, at 32–34. 
 52. Id. at 34. 
 53. See id. at 33, 36. 
 54. Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State 
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1519 (2009). 
 55. See id. at 1522. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Galie & Bopst, supra note 20, at 35–36. 
 58. Id. at 38. 
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makes it clear that any convention functions within very effective 
practical limitations.’”59  If too much democracy is a perceived problem 
when it comes to constitutional conventions, the state experiences have 
not borne that out.  “[T]he proposed revisions which have been approved 
are fairly characterized as moderately progressive and have generally 
been applauded as valuable improvements over the status quo.”60 
Many states use constitutional commissions, which perform a variety 
of roles.  Some commissions merely study the state’s constitution, 
reporting data but making no recommendations.61  Others collect 
information and prepare recommendations in advance of constitutional 
conventions to assist the convention delegates.62  Still others propose 
constitutional revisions to be submitted to the legislature or the voters.63  
Roughly two-thirds of the states used constitutional commissions in one 
way or another between 1971 and 2001.64  Because any recommendations 
made by constitutional commissions require approval by the legislature 
or the voters, and usually both, this device does not amount to an 
independent form of constitutional revision but an added procedure 
designed to smooth the path to constitutional reform. 
When critics speak of unduly frequent constitutional revisions or, 
less charitably, of “amendomania,”65 they usually mean the last method 
of reform: the popular initiative.  First adopted by South Dakota in 
1898,66 and initially conceived of as a progressive reform, the initiative is 
used by just over a third of the states to approve constitutional 
amendments.67  But “nowhere is the practice of government by voter 
initiative as extreme as it is in California.”68  After serving for many 
years on the California Supreme Court, and after observing how the 
initiative has contributed “to the ease with which California’s 
Constitution can be—and regularly is—amended,” Chief Justice George 
                                                     
 59. Id. at 39 (quoting VERNON O’ROURKE & DOUGLASS CAMPBELL, CONSTITUTION-MAKING 
IN A DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN NEW YORK STATE 26 (1943)). 
 60. Id. at 40. 
 61. Id. at 42. 
 62. Id. at 42–43. 
 63. Id. 43–44. 
 64. Peter J. Galie & Christopher Bopst, The Constitutional Commission in New York: A Worthy 
Tradition, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1285, 1316 (2001). 
 65. See Faust, supra note 29, at 1019. 
 66. S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 
ALMANAC 12 (2003); Ronald M. George, Keynote Address, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1515, 1516 (2010). 
 67. Galie & Bopst, supra note 20, at 46 (“Eighteen states permit the proposing of amendments 
by popular initiative.”). 
 68. George, supra note 66, at 1516; see also HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 7, at 927–30. 
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lamented that the process is “dysfunctional,” often turns solely on 
whether a proposal is sufficiently well-funded, and has “result[ed] in the 
perpetual instability of California’s state constitutional law.”69  Others 
echo this criticism of direct democracy as applied to all states that use 
it.70 
Rather than take sides on this debate, let me instead accept the 
charges as true—for argument’s sake—and try to place them in context.  
A minority of states use this procedure, and thus only a minority of states 
run the risk of suffering from it.  To the extent this type of reform 
contains structural deficiencies, as Chief Justice George warns, there is 
no reason to think that it is beyond the people of the affected states to 
listen to, appreciate, and eventually even respond to the pitfalls.  In this 
sense, a fifty-one percent tipping point for amending a state constitution 
is as much an ally as an obstacle to reform, particularly structural reform.  
And if, for one reason or another, a majority of a state’s citizens do not 
want to change such a pivotal method of reform, it is fair to ask whether 
they deserve—or at least have decided to embrace—the alleged “chaos” 
that results.71  So far, as it turns out, roughly sixty percent of Californians 
still respect decisions made by voters through the initiative process more 
than decisions made by the governor and legislature.72 
Not just Californians have a chance to experiment with and, if need 
be, alter the initiative process, but so do the residents of other states.  
Justice Paul Pfeifer of the Ohio Supreme Court recently called for 
reforms of the Ohio Constitution, which also permits constitutional 
initiatives.73  He complained that the Ohio Constitution was too long, 
encumbered by too many non-fundamental provisions, warning that 
                                                     
 69. George, supra note 66, at 1516, 1518. 
 70. See, e.g., Michaele L. Ferguson, Initiatives, Referenda, and the Problem of Democratic 
Inclusion: A Reply to John Gastil and Kevin O’Leary, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1537, 1538–39 (2007) 
(“[W]hile initiatives and referenda are taken to be forms of direct democracy, moneyed interests 
frequently play a significant role in acquiring the signatures necessary to put an initiative on the 
ballot, in crafting the language of the legislation, and in campaigning for or against particular 
measures.”); Susan P. Fino, A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Taxation and Finance Provisions in 
State Constitutions, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 959, 982 (2003) (“[T]he initiative has become a tool of special 
interests with money to spend and axes to grind.”). 
 71. See Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
239, 272 (2004) (noting that “judges are wary of direct democracy and of unusual political 
arrangements that seem chaotic or dangerous”); Kimon Valaskakis, The Perils of “Dumb” 
Democracy, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 295, 302 (2007) (explaining that direct democracy “could result in 
major chaotic results given the lack of sophisticated political information and the volatility of public 
opinion”). 
 72. George, supra note 66, at 1519. 
 73. See Alan Johnson, Pfeifer: Revise Constitution, End Death Penalty, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, 
Jan. 20, 2011, at 1B. 
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“[Ohio doesn’t] want to end up like California, adding things all the 
time.”74  When it comes to the rules for constitutional reform, as opposed 
to the weather, Ohioans remain free to pick the model they want, a time-
respected virtue of federalism. 
Many of the eighteen states that permit constitutional initiatives also 
place limitations on them.75  Some place certain topics off limits: 
Mississippi excludes its Bill of Rights from the procedure; Illinois allows 
only initiatives related to “the legislative article”; and Massachusetts 
precludes the initiative from affecting its Declaration of Rights, the 
judiciary, or issues concerning religion.76  The states also limit the 
procedure by requiring not-insignificant numbers of signatures before an 
initiative goes on the ballot: Arizona requires fifteen percent of all votes 
cast in the last election for governor, while Oklahoma requires fifteen 
percent of votes cast in the race receiving the highest number of votes.77  
California requires eight percent of all votes cast for governor in the last 
gubernatorial election.78  Half of the affected states ensure that the 
initiative relates to a statewide concern, not a local one.  Typical of this 
last restriction is Florida, which demands signatures from eight percent 
of the votes cast in the last presidential election in at least half of the 
congressional districts.79  Still other restrictions exist.  In Nevada, an 
initiative must receive majority support in back-to-back general 
elections.80  A few states require some measure of legislative approval 
even for popular initiatives.81  And the state constitutions’ single-subject 
                                                     
 74. Id.; see also Ed Golder, Voters Take Law into Own Hands—Ballot Issues Bypass 
Legislature, But Is That a Good Thing?, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Oct. 29, 2006, at A1 (quoting the 
executive vice president of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce saying, “We don’t want to end up 
like California, where people have to stand in the voting booth and guess about the fiscal impact or 
the meaning of one ballot proposal after another after another.”); Steven Greenhut, Op-Ed., Careful 
What You Wish For: Some Powerful Players Want to Overhaul the California Constitution. What 
Could Go Wrong with That?, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 14, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 
15599355 (discussing candidate Meg Whitman’s proposal to reform California’s initiative process as 
part of a constitutional convention). 
 75. Galie & Bopst, supra note 20, at 46, 49–51. 
 76. Id. at 51. 
 77. Id. 
 78. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b); see also George, supra note 66, at 1520. 
 79. Galie & Bopst, supra note 20, at 51. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See William B. Fisch, Constitutional Referendum in the United States of America, 54 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 485, 494–97 (2006).  After Massachusetts citizens collect sufficient signatures for a 
constitutional initiative, at least twenty-five percent of two successive legislatures must approve it.  
See MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. IV, § 4.  Even with only one-quarter support required, 
this procedure “has proven quite difficult to navigate” with only three initiatives getting to the ballot 
in eighty-seven years, two of which passed.  Fisch, supra, at 495.  The Kansas Constitution provides 
for amendment by referendum, but only after two-thirds of the total members of each legislative 
 
SUTTON FINAL 5/14/2011  12:43:55 PM 
698 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
requirements generally prohibit placing more than one initiative on the 
same ballot at a time.82 
While many initiatives address individual rights, the states have not 
been one-sided in addressing them.  Galie and Bopst report that, between 
1970 and 1986, the states passed seventy-six legislative initiatives 
amending their constitutions, and “40 were rights restrictive and 36 
rights enhancing.”83  Between 1986 and 1990, this pattern continued with 
“20 restrictive and 19 expansive measures adopted.”84  A high percentage 
of rights-restrictive amendments involved criminal procedure, it is true, 
but that development is not inconsistent with what went on in the federal 
courts, Congress, and the state legislatures over the same period of 
time.85 
Is it always the case, moreover, that legal guarantees, even individual 
rights guarantees, should be discounted because they are democratic?  Is 
there a risk, as one scholar wonders, of becoming too obsessed with 
countermajoritarianism, of losing sight of the possibility that 
supermajority requirements are not invariably a precondition of progress 
and occasionally may be an impediment to it?86  Some of the landmarks 
in federal constitutional law no doubt represented the epitome of 
countermajoritarian law at the time they were issued.  Brown v. Board of 
Education comes to mind.  As does West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette.87  Yet one of the most significant civil rights 
breakthroughs in American history came not from the interpretation of a 
countermajoritarian guarantee but from the adoption of a majoritarian 
one: the Civil Rights Act of 1964.88  All things being equal, would one 
rather live in a country (or a state) in which a citizen consensus protects 
the rights of minority groups or in which a court consensus does so?  
That state constitutional provisions are more responsive to the will of the 
people at a given point in time than the Federal Constitution is not 
invariably a curse.89 
                                                                                                                       
house approve the initiative.  See KAN. CONST. art. 14, § 1. 
 82. Galie & Bopst, supra note 20, at 50. 
 83. Id. at 35. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Sanford Levinson, How the United States Constitution Contributes to the Democratic 
Deficit in America, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 859, 869 (2007). 
 87. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 88. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to h-6). 
 89. See generally LEVINSON, supra note 41 (citing as examples of out-of-date federal 
constitutional provisions the citizenship-duration requirement for elected officials, judicial life 
tenure, and the Article V amendment process). 
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All of this underscores the perils of generalization, whether about the 
ease with which state constitutions can be amended, the impact of the 
amendment procedures on state government, or the impact of these 
procedures on individual rights.  The variations prove not that state 
constitutions as a group are too populist but instead that choosing rules 
for altering charters of government is complex, leading to a variety of 
paths for preserving lasting but relevant charters, nearly all of which add 
meaningful obstacles to the amendment process—obstacles that do not 
encumber the passage of ordinary law. 
IV. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
State constitutions face a related critique, that the judges tasked with 
interpreting them are elected.  This feature of most state judiciaries, the 
argument goes, adds a second fault line in any effort to protect 
individuals from their government: elected judges may lack the will to 
defy the majority in a given case, and even when they muster the 
courage, the majority may change the constitution in response. 
One need not look far to find critics of judicial elections.  The 
alleged faults are many: The fundraising demands of running for office 
create appearance problems;90 the courts were designed to be the non-
political branch of government, making it odd to select judges through 
the ballot box;91 the electorate lacks sufficient information to choose 
judges effectively;92 and popularly elected judges are unwilling to protect 
unpopular groups, particularly those charged with crime.93  If Justice 
O’Connor, who was herself a state court judge and who spent twenty-six 
years reviewing the work of the state supreme courts, thinks contested 
judicial elections are unsound, perhaps that is reason enough to listen.94  
The same goes for the like-minded criticisms of Chief Justice Moyer of 
                                                     
 90. See Deborah Goldberg, Public Funding of Judicial Elections: The Roles of Judges and the 
Rules of Campaign Finance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 95 (2003); Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody 
Knows and What Too Few Accept, 123 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104–06 (2009). 
 91. See Sandra Day O’Connor, “Choosing (and Recusing) Our State Court Justices Wisely”: 
Keynote Remarks by Justice O’Connor, 99 GEO. L.J. 151, 151–52 (2010). 
 92. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters for 
Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1270 (2008). 
 93. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role 
Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1349, 1404 (2010). 
 94. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Op.-Ed., The Threat to Judicial Independence, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 27, 2006, at A18; see also Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to 
Judicial Independence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367, 368 (2002); Joseph E. Lambert, Contestable 
Judicial Elections: Maintaining Respectability in the Post-White Era, 94 KY. L.J. 1, 10 (2005). 
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the Ohio Supreme Court, a highly respected state jurist who presided 
over that court for twenty-four years.95 
Others wonder what is wrong with allowing the people of a state to 
respond to judicial decisions they do not like.96  They argue that judicial 
elections are democratic, establish accountability, and limit overreaching 
by the judiciary, adding that a system of political appointments does not 
necessarily produce better—or more impartial—judges.97  And as 
election defenders frequently point out, many people like having the 
choice.98 
No matter how strongly one criticizes or defends judicial elections, 
the impact of them on state constitutional law should not be overstated.  
It is true that eighty-seven percent of the state judges throughout the 
country must face the electorate at regular intervals.99  But just as the 
states’ methods of constitutional reform vary, so do their methods of 
judicial selection.100 
Twelve states do not use popular elections to select or retain judges 
for their highest courts.101  Twenty-six states rely on the governor to 
nominate or appoint judges.102  Eight states include the legislature in a 
confirmation process,103 while two rely on a government-created council 
to approve or nominate candidates.104  In Virginia and South Carolina, 
the governor plays no formal role, and the legislature selects the 
judges.105  While most of these states provide fixed terms of office 
                                                     
 95. Thomas J. Moyer, From Kiev to Columbus: A Perspective on Judicial Independence, 82 
IND. L.J. 1235, 1235 n.*, 1236 (2007). 
 96. See, e.g., John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and 
Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 488 (1999); William B. Rubenstein, 
The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT., 599, 619–20 (1999); William H. Pryor, Jr., Neither 
Force nor Will, but Merely Judgment, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2006, at A14. 
 97. See Michael DeBow et al., The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 
393, 396, 399 (2002). 
 98. See, e.g., Editorial, Mixed Signals: People Want to Elect Judges but Don’t Know Them, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Mar. 26, 2000, at 2C. 
 99. Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 566. 
 100. See generally Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the 
Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993) (offering an historical 
analysis of why most states moved from appointments to elections of their judges). 
 101. See Devins, supra note 20, at 1645–47; Methods of Judicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC’Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2011). 
 102. See Devins, supra note 20, at 1645–47; Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 101. 
 103. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont.  See Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 101. 
 104. These two are Massachusetts and New Hampshire.  See id. 
 105. See id. 
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ranging from six to fourteen years,106 four do not.  Massachusetts and 
New Hampshire allow judges, once appointed, to serve until age 
seventy.107  In New Jersey, once judges have been reappointed after an 
initial seven-year term, they may serve until seventy.108  After 
appointment, judges in Rhode Island enjoy life tenure.109 
Judges in eighteen states face retention elections but are not initially 
selected through elections.  Whether appointed by the state’s governor, a 
nominating commission, or some other body, judges in these states face 
what amounts to popular reappointment votes, as they are the only 
individuals on the ballot.110  A high percentage of judges win these 
elections,111 and these contests usually do not impose heavy, if any, 
fundraising demands on judges.112  Recently, there have been notable 
exceptions to the contrary, and perhaps they suggest a trend.113  Yet, 
historically, there has been considerable support for this approach to 
balancing judicial independence and accountability.114 
Two states, Illinois and Pennsylvania, combine retention elections 
with more traditional elections in selecting their judges.  They fill 
vacancies through contested elections, then require the judges to win 
periodic retention elections to stay on the court.115 
                                                     
 106. Compare VT. CONST. ch. II, § 34 (showing the term for Vermont judges is six years), with 
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (showing the term length for New York judges is fourteen years). 
 107. MASS. CONST. amend. art. XCVIII; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 73, 78. 
 108. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § VI, ¶ 3. 
 109. See R.I. CONST. art. X, § 5. 
 110. Devins, supra note 20, at 1645–47.  For its supreme court and court of appeals, Tennessee 
also uses appointments and retention elections.  See TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3; TENN. CODE ANN. 
§§ 17-4-112, -115, -116 (West Supp. 2011). 
 111. Less than one percent of the 6306 state court judges who faced retention elections between 
1964 and 2006 lost.  Rachel Paine Caufield, Reconciling the Judicial Ideal and the Democratic 
Impulse in Judicial Retention Elections, 74 MO. L. REV. 573, 577 (2009). 
 112. Between 1999 and 2006, judicial candidates in contested elections raised $157 million, 
while candidates in retention elections raised only $1.5 million.  Id. at 580. 
 113. In 2010, three Iowa Supreme Court justices lost their seats in retention elections.  A.G. 
Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A1; see also 
Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of Three Justices, 59 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 715 (2011).  Judges in Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Illinois, and Florida faced elections in 
2010, but they were all reelected.  Sulzberger, supra. 
 114. See Aman McLeod, If at First You Don’t Succeed: A Critical Evaluation of Judicial 
Selection Reform Efforts, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 512–13 (2005) (describing the American 
Judicature Society’s support for retention elections); Debra Cassens Weiss, O’Connor: Want a 
Qualified, Impartial Judiciary? Don’t Use Contested Elections, ABA J. (Dec. 10, 2009), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/oconnor_want_a_qualified_impartial_judiciary_dont_use_c
ontested_elections/ (describing Justice O’Connor’s support for an appointment process with 
retention elections).  But see G. Alan Tarr, Do Retention Elections Work?, 74 MO. L. REV. 605 
(2009) (suggesting retention elections themselves have become politicized). 
 115. Devins, supra note 20, at 1645. 
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The remaining nineteen states select judges through contested 
elections in which two or more opponents may appear on the ballot.116  
Of these, fifteen are handled through nonpartisan election,117 meaning 
that a judge’s party affiliation does not appear on the ballot, while four 
select judges through partisan elections.118 
All told, roughly three-fifths of the states (twenty-nine) do not use 
traditional elections to choose their judges.  And of the twenty-one states 
that use elections in which two or more candidates may be on the ballot, 
only four of them involve partisan elections.  Roughly eighty-five 
percent of incumbent state supreme court justices in open elections, 
whether partisan or nonpartisan, win reelection.119  More than ninety-
eight percent of justices win retention elections.120  An overview of the 
states’ approaches to judicial selection thus reveals a range of 
approaches—including some that roughly parallel the federal selection 
model—and confirms that only a discrete minority use party-based 
election models. 
Instead of undermining state constitutional law, this diversity of 
judicial-selection methods confirms the difficulty of the task at hand: 
how to use a majoritarian process to pick candidates for a 
nonmajoritarian job.  There is no such thing as a nondemocratic approach 
to picking American judges.  Even the United States Constitution 
requires a popularly elected President to make the nominations and a 
popularly elected Senate to confirm them.121  Life tenure after that, 
                                                     
 116. Id.  Though Tennessee elects its trial court judges, it initially appoints supreme court 
justices and court of appeals judges and uses retention elections.  Id. at 1646 n.95; see also TENN. 
CONST. art. VI, § 3; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-112, -114, -115, -116 (West Supp. 2011). 
 117. Devins, supra note 20, at 1646–47; see ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 18; GA. CONST. art. VI, 
§ VII, ¶ I; IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 6, art. VI, § 7; KY. CONST. §§ 117–19; MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 2; 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.392 (West 2008); MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7; MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 204D.08(6) (West 2008), 204D.11(6) (West 2009); MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 145; MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 23-15-976 (West 2003); MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 8; MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-14-111 
(2009); NEV. CONST. art. 6, § 3; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.195 (West 2008); N.C. CONST. art. 
IV, § 16; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-322 (West 2007); N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7; N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 16.1-11-08 (West 2008); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 3505.04, 3513.01, 3513.08 (West 2007); OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 254.005(8) (West 2007); WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 3; WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.52.231 (West 2005); 
WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 5.60 (West 2005). 
 118. Devins, supra note 20, at 1646–47; see ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 152; LA. CONST. art. V, 
§ 22; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2; W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (West 2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 3-5-4. 
 119. Chris W. Bonneau, Vacancies on the Bench: Open-Seat Elections for State Supreme Courts, 
27 JUST. SYS. J. 143, 144 (2006). 
 120. Id.; see also Caufield, supra note 111, at 577. 
 121. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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together with a prohibition on reducing pay, may help to insulate federal 
judges from politics, but the judges still must be selected at the outset by 
office holders who obtained a majority, not a minority, of votes. 
Even if we characterize the models adopted by the federal 
government and twelve of the states as the most insulated from electoral 
politics, it is difficult to deny that those involved in the selection and 
confirmation process have become increasingly accountable to the 
electorate for their choices.  A central critique of state judicial elections 
is the risk of “backlash” and the impact this may have on judicial 
decisions.122  Whatever the nature of that threat, is it not possible that 
federal judicial decisions over the last five decades have affected later 
nominations and confirmations?  Many say they have.123 
Critics of judicial elections, particularly those who think they make 
ordinary law out of constitutional law, also must account for state court 
decisions over the last several decades, in which elected judges granted 
individual-rights protections that life-tenured federal justices would not.  
A narrative assuming that only politically insulated judges will protect 
politically disfavored rights must account for a range of contrary state 
court decisions.  When the United States Supreme Court rejected the 
claims that education was a fundamental right and that wealth was a 
suspect class in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,124 
that did not end inquiries into the constitutionality of the fifty state 
school-funding systems.  Over the next thirty-five years, forty-five states 
faced state-constitutional challenges to their funding programs, and 
twenty-eight of the states, Texas included, chose to grant relief that the 
federal court would not.125 
A similar story is unfolding in the aftermath of Kelo v. City of New 
London.126  After the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the states to continue 
to defeat takings claims through broad conceptions of eminent-domain 
                                                     
 122. See Devins, supra note 20, at 1654–74. 
 123. See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS 
IN ANGRY TIMES 10–14 (2006); Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the 
Battle for the Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 874–78 (2005); Lori A. Ringhand, In 
Defense of Ideology: A Principled Approach to the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 18 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 131, 166–71 (2009); David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial 
Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1057–72 (2008); see generally JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, 
SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (2007). 
 124. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 125. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its 
Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963, 1974–76 (2008). 
 126. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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“public use,” the states insisted on change, whether through state court 
decisions or state legislative initiatives.127  More than half of the states so 
far have granted relief that Kelo would not.128 
Employment Division v. Smith129 tells a similar story.  After Smith 
held that neutral, generally applicable laws trigger rational basis, not 
strict scrutiny, review of free exercise claims,130 many states assessed the 
issue for themselves, as Smith indeed contemplated they could.  Since 
Smith, twelve state supreme courts have held that their constitutions 
provide greater protection for free exercise of religion.131  On top of this, 
thirteen states have adopted legislative religious freedom protections.132  
All of this, moreover, came at the same time Congress was passing 
similar legislation at the national level, first through the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1933133 and eventually through the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.134  Even in the 
criminal procedure arena, case books can be filled with state court 
decisions opting to grant relief that the United States Supreme Court 
would not.135 
                                                     
 127. See Sutton, supra note 125, at 1984–85. 
 128. See Steven J. Eagle & Lauren A. Perotti, Coping with Kelo: A Potpourri of Legislative and 
Judicial Responses, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 799, 803, 829–45 (2008). 
 129. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 130. Id. at 884–91. 
 131. See Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State 
Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235, 245–47 (1998); see also Huffman v. State, 204 P.3d 339, 344 
(Alaska 2009); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 280–81 (Alaska 2009); 
City of Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443, 445–46 (Ind. 2001); 
State v. Van Winkle, 889 P.2d 749, 754–55 (Kan. 1995); Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 66 
(Me. 1992); Kolodziej v. Smith, 588 N.E.2d 634, 637 (Mass. 1992); Soc’y of Jesus v. Boston 
Landmarks Comm’n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Mass. 1990); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 
396–97 (Minn. 1990); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8–9 (Minn. 1990); St. John’s Lutheran Church 
v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 830 P.2d 1271, 1276–77 (Mont. 1992); Palmer v. Palmer, 545 N.W.2d 
751, 755 (Neb. 1996); Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 465–67 
(N.Y. 2006); Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 (Ohio 2000); Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 
850 (Vt. 1994); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 182–83 (Wash. 
1992). 
 132. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 
1465, 1468 (1999); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 52-571b (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01–05 (West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§§ 73-401–404 (West 2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1–99 (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT.  
§§ 1.302–307 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1–5 (West 2003); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 51, 
§§ 251–58 (West 2008); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2401–2407 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 42-80-1–4 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10–60 (2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. §§ 110.001–012 (West 2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (West 2009). 
 133. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 
bb-4). 
 134. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-5). 
 135. See generally State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990) (finding that the good-faith 
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What if we switch from landmark federal constitutional decisions 
that deny relief to decisions that grant relief?  Did the National Supreme 
Court march alone or were the state and federal courts traveling similar 
paths or at least borrowing from each other in the process? 
Brown v. Board of Education,136 perhaps the most prominent 
example of federal judicial relief in the face of recalcitrant states, paints a 
complicated picture.  The companion case to Brown, Bolling v. 
Sharpe,137 involved the segregated schools of the District of Columbia, a 
federal enclave that no state court or legislature could reach.  And the 
“separate but equal” defense raised in both Brown and Bolling was one 
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s own making.138  Before Brown, seventeen 
states, like the District of Columbia, segregated their schools, sixteen 
prohibited segregation in schools, four allowed local districts to decide 
the matter, and eleven had no laws on the subject.139 
Mapp v. Ohio140 and the development of the exclusionary rule 
involved a state–federal judicial partnership that continues to this day.  
Several state courts innovated the rule around the turn of the twentieth 
century.141  The United States Supreme Court embraced the rule for 
federal law enforcement in 1914 in Weeks v. United States.142  By 1949, 
when the Supreme Court refused to extend Weeks to the states through 
incorporation,143 sixteen states had adopted their own exclusionary 
rules.144  And by 1961, when Mapp extended the rule to the states, over 
half of the states had embraced the rule on their own, a point Mapp itself 
                                                                                                                       
exception to the exclusionary rule recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court did not exist under 
Connecticut law); Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170 (Del. 1990) (affording greater protections under 
Delaware’s version of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel than those under the Federal 
Constitution); Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169 (Mass. 2000) (recognizing greater 
state constitutional privileges against compelled self-incrimination than under federal law); People v. 
Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992) (recognizing greater protection under Michigan law against 
“cruel and unusual” punishment than under federal law); Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the 
Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State 
Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1017 (1997) (“Tallies are 
periodically made and updated of the numbers of cases in which state courts have, under their own 
constitutions, recognized rights beyond those in the Federal Constitution.  Most of us have stopped 
counting.”) (citation omitted). 
 136. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 137. 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954). 
 138. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896). 
 139. Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional Ghetto, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 627, 
666 & n.177. 
 140. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 141. See Blocher, supra note 34, at 372 n.255. 
 142. 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. 
 143. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. 
 144. Blocher, supra note 34, at 372. 
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acknowledged in opting not to follow its earlier non-incorporation 
decision.145  On this historical slate, it is no overstatement to conclude 
that the Court “relied on the states not just as independent expositors of 
constitutional values, but as laboratories whose practical experience with 
constitutional rules was enlightening.”146  Nor is the “dialogue” over.  
Since the Court developed an exception to the exclusionary rule for 
officers who rely in good faith on the existence of a warrant in United 
States v. Leon,147 twenty state courts have declined to apply the Leon 
good-faith exception under their own constitutions.148 
District of Columbia v. Heller149 followed a course that most of the 
state courts had charted.  Before interpreting the Second Amendment to 
protect an individual right to bear arms—as opposed to a collective 
right—most of the state courts had already ruled the same way under 
their own constitutions.  Forty-four state constitutions protect the right to 
keep and bear arms, and thirty-nine of the courts in those states had 
interpreted these provisions to protect an individual right to keep arms 
before Heller.150  The lone exception is Massachusetts, which has held 
that its provision protected a collective right rather than an individual 
right.151  Kansas, whose court had formerly held that the right to bear 
arms was a collective one,152 amended its constitution last year to make it 
clear that the right is individual.153  Hawaii and Virginia have not 
addressed the issue.154 
The point of this discussion is not to laud or lament these decisions.  
It is to reveal the risk of generalizing about the impact of judicial 
elections on state constitutional law and still more so on the future of 
state constitutional law.  As with the impact of majoritarian amendment 
procedures, the election story is a complex and nuanced one.  Here too 
we have a conundrum—finding a democratic way to pick people for a 
                                                     
 145. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651; Blocher, supra note 34, at 372–73. 
 146. Blocher, supra note 34, at 373. 
 147. 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). 
 148. Blocher, supra note 34, at 373.  Professor Blocher describes similar state–federal 
partnerships in the development of other federal constitutional claims, including the actual-malice 
test under the First Amendment, the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and the 
prohibition of race and gender discrimination in jury selection.  Id. at 370–75. 
 149. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 150. Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 191, 192, 205–06 (2006). 
 151. Id. at 205. 
 152. See City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 620 (Kan. 1905). 
 153. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 4. 
 154. See Volokh, supra note 150, at 205. 
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nonmajoritarian job—and here too we have a range of state and federal 
experiences in responding to the problem, with many chapters of the 
story still left to be told. 
V. LOCKSTEP INTERPRETATIONS 
Some state courts diminish their constitutions by interpreting them in 
lockstep with the Federal Constitution,155 occasionally at the beck and 
call of the state constitution itself.156  The issue arises when the Federal 
Constitution and a state constitution contain an identical or similarly 
worded guarantee and a litigant invokes both of them, by arguing, say, 
that an arrest violates the federal and state prohibitions on “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”157  There is no reason to think, as an interpretive 
matter, that constitutional guarantees of independent sovereigns, even 
guarantees with the same or similar words, must be construed the same.  
Still less is there reason to think that a highly generalized guarantee, such 
as a prohibition on “unreasonable” searches, would have just one 
meaning for a range of differently situated sovereigns.  Yet in my 
experience, state and federal courts frequently handle such cases by 
considering the federal constitutional claim first, after which they 
summarily announce that the state provision means the same thing.158 
                                                     
 155. See Blocher, supra note 34, at 339 (“To this day, most state courts adopt federal 
constitutional law as their own.  Bowing to the nationalization of constitutional discourse, they ‘tend 
to follow whatever doctrinal vocabulary is used by the United States Supreme Court, discussed in 
the law reviews, and taught in the law schools.’” (quoting Hans A. Linde, E. Pluribus—
Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 186 (1984))). 
 156. See FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 17 (requiring that Florida courts construe the state 
constitutional right against unlawful searches, seizures, and excessive punishments “in conformity 
with” the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, respectively, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court); 
cf. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a) (“A person may not be . . . denied equal protection of the laws; 
provided, that nothing . . . imposes upon the State . . . any obligations or responsibilities which 
exceed those imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation.”); Raven v. 
Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089 (Cal. 1990) (striking down a section of Proposition 115 that 
prevented state courts from construing the California constitution to afford greater rights to criminal 
defendants than the Federal Constitution). 
 157. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 158. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 3 A.3d 806, 839 (Conn. 2010) (holding that “the Connecticut 
constitution does not provide criminal defendants with greater protections than does the federal 
constitution in the context of unrelated questioning, including requests for consent to search, made 
during routine traffic stops”); State v. Stevens, 367 N.W.2d 788, 796–97 (Wis. 1985) (holding that 
search of garbage did not violate Wisconsin or Federal Constitutions); see also People v. Collins, 
475 N.W.2d 684, 691 (Mich. 1991) (stating that the Michigan constitutional provision prohibiting 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” should “be construed to provide the same protection as that 
secured by the Fourth Amendment, absent ‘compelling reason’ to impose a different 
interpretation.”); State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist. Court of Appeals, 588 N.E.2d 116, 
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Why the meaning of a federal guarantee proves the meaning of an 
independent state guarantee is rarely explained and often seems 
inexplicable.  If the court decisions of another sovereign ought to bear on 
the inquiry, those of a sister state should have more to say about the 
point.  State constitutions are more likely to share historical and cultural 
similarities.  They necessarily will cover smaller jurisdictions.  And in 
almost all instances they will be construing individual-liberty guarantees 
that originated in state constitutions, not the Federal Constitution,159 and 
they indeed will be exercising a power—judicial review—that originated 
in state constitutional law, not in Marbury v. Madison.160 
Why borrow in particular from the larger, far larger, jurisdiction?  
Federalism considerations may lead the United States Supreme Court to 
underenforce (or at least not to overenforce) constitutional guarantees in 
view of the number of people affected (over 300 million) and the range 
of jurisdictions implicated (one national government, fifty states, and 
thousands of local governments).161  No state supreme court, by contrast, 
has any reason to apply a “federalism discount” to its decisions,162 
making it odd for state courts to rely exclusively on the meaning of the 
Federal Constitution in construing their own. 
State court decisions of this type not only seem to be prioritizing the 
wrong decisions in determining the meaning of their own constitutions, 
but they also seem to be inverting the right sequence for considering state 
and federal arguments.  Federal constitutional avoidance principles 
would suggest that the state guarantee ought to be considered first.  If the 
                                                                                                                       
123 (Ohio 1992) (declining to find greater free speech guarantees in the Ohio Constitution than the 
Federal Constitution); In re F.C. III, 2 A.3d 1201, 1212 (Pa. 2010) (“[W]e find the due process rights 
implicated herein under our Constitution to be equal to those under the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.”); cf. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. City of Detroit Downtown Dev. Auth., 
567 F.3d 278, 301 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that, under Michigan law, the establishment clauses of 
the Michigan and Federal Constitutions are interpreted the same way). 
 159. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 501 (1977) (“Prior to the adoption of the federal Constitution, each of 
the rights eventually recognized in the federal Bill of Rights had previously been protected in one or 
more state constitutions.”); Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP. 
L. REV. 989, 997 (1996) (“[S]tate Declarations of Rights were the primary origin and model for the 
provisions set forth in the Federal Bill of Rights.”); Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State Constitution-
Making in the American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911, 911 (1993) (“The office of our 
governors, the bicameral legislatures, tripartite separation of powers, bills of rights, and the unique 
use of constitutional conventions were all born during the state constitution-making period between 
1775 and the early 1780s, well before the federal constitution of 1787 was created.”). 
 160. Blocher, supra note 34, at 334. 
 161. See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1747 (2006); 
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218, 1248 (1978); see also Sutton, supra note 125, at 1978–79. 
 162. Sutton, supra note 125, at 1979. 
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state supreme court grants relief to the claimant on the state ground and 
provides a clear statement that it is doing so,163 the case is over, and the 
need to construe the federal constitutional provision disappears with it.164  
No version of the constitutional avoidance doctrine to my knowledge 
says that courts should consider the claim arising from the larger 
sovereign before they consider the claim arising from the smaller one. 
The nature of a federal constitutional claim points in the same 
direction.  At issue is whether state action violates the Federal 
Constitution.  If the state constitution prohibits the law or conduct at 
issue, however, there is no work for the Federal Constitution to do.165  
Why not consider that point first, not as a matter of exhaustion, but as a 
matter of potentially eliminating any ultra vires state action at all and 
sparing the need to consider the federal claim in the process?  By 
deciding the federal claim first, state courts engage in federal 
constitutional aggrandizement, not avoidance, and they risk diminishing 
their state constitutions in the process.  By doing the reverse, they claim 
the rightful independence of their state constitutions. 
In defense of the state (and federal) courts that take this path, 
explanations abound.  As a matter of history, state constitutional law may 
have been all that mattered in the country’s first 150 years, at least from 
the perspective of an individual-rights claimant.166  But the incorporation 
of most of the Bill of Rights beginning in the 1920s started to change 
that, and the expansion of federal constitutional protections in the 1950s 
and 1960s completed the transformation.  After the breakthroughs of the 
Warren Court revolution, who could blame state courts and advocates for 
relegating state constitutional claims to second-class treatment, if indeed 
to any treatment at all?  A tradition of jurisprudence premised on the 
predominance of federal rights may not be easy to undo.  Even though 
twenty-first century state courts are as apt to be constitutional innovators 
as federal courts,167 decades of state court precedents remain on the 
books paralleling the federal precedents or at least starting their analyses 
with them. 
                                                     
 163. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 164. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 37 (1996); Long, 463 U.S. at 1041–42. 
 165. See State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Or. 1983) (Linde, J.); see also Hans A. Linde, 
E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 176 (1984). 
 166. See generally Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) 
(declining to apply Fifth Amendment as a limitation on the states). 
 167. Cf. Brennan, supra note 159, at 491; Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal 
and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1093 (1985). 
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Efficiencies also may make a difference.  Keep in mind that, by one 
count, ninety-five percent of the disputes resolved by courts in this 
country are filed in the state courts, as opposed to the federal ones.168  
Just one of those courts, the California Supreme Court, resolved thirty-
seven state constitutional law disputes in 2005, while the United States 
Supreme Court resolved thirty federal constitutional law disputes that 
same year.169  All of this makes it understandable that state courts would 
keep up with their burgeoning dockets by sticking to the calf-path rather 
than diverging from it.170 
Also daunting is the reality, at least the one I have experienced, that 
many advocates do not press the state arguments on an independent 
basis.  What is argued is not a ground-up assessment of the independent 
meaning of the state guarantee, premised on its language, its history, or 
early understandings of its meaning.  The point urged instead is that the 
state courts should construe the state guarantee differently because they 
can, not because they must, or because the dissent rather than the 
majority in a U.S. Supreme Court case has the better of the (federal) 
arguments. 
This is the one respect in which Justice Brennan’s boundary-crossing 
1977 article171 delivered less than it could have for the development of 
state constitutional law.  With the waning of civil rights victories brought 
by the end of the Warren Court and the beginning of the Burger Court, 
Justice Brennan pressed the state courts to fortify the breach, to grant 
relief by another name: a state constitution.172  “It may not be wide of the 
mark,” he said, “to suppose that . . . state courts discern, and disagree 
with, a trend in recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court to 
pull back from, or at least suspend for the time being, the . . . application 
of the federal Bill of Rights and the restraints of the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.”173  State courts, 
he thus urged, “cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full 
protections of the federal Constitution,” but should grant relief under 
their own constitutions instead.174 
                                                     
 168. George, supra note 66, at 1515. 
 169. Devins, supra note 20, at 1635. 
 170. See SAM WALTER FOSS, The Calf-Path, in WHIFFS FROM WILD MEADOWS 77, 79–80 
(1895) (“For men are prone to go it blind / Along the calf-paths of the mind, / And work away from 
sun to sun / To do what other men have done.”). 
 171. See Brennan, supra note 159. 
 172. Id. at 490–91. 
 173. Id. at 495. 
 174. Id. at 491. 
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In one respect, Justice Brennan was right.  Constitutional claimants 
should prefer two arrows in their quiver—two chances, not just one, to 
invalidate a state or local law.  But the messenger and the message may 
have helped to perpetuate, if not to create, two damaging myths. 
The messenger may have prompted state court advocates and judges 
to misperceive this option as designed only to be a liberal ratchet, to give 
just some rights but not others a second chance in the state courts.  Yet as 
shown above, independent state courts (and legislatures) often have 
protected a range of rights, whether involving liberty, equality, or 
property, whether before or after the federal courts entered the picture.  
That the state constitutions provide a second avenue for invalidating a 
local law says nothing about what kind of law should be, or will be, 
challenged.175 
The message pushed one feature of state constitutional law (the 
authority of the states to construe their constitutions differently) at the 
expense of another (an independent basis for doing so).  The suggested 
inquiry was not whether state constitutional law demanded a different 
answer from federal constitutional law based on language, context, and 
history; it was that, if there is a will, there is now a new way for granting 
relief.176  Instead of urging first-principle inquiries into the meaning of 
the state provisions, the article urged state courts to side with the 
dissenters in debates already held at the United States Supreme Court—
under federal law no less.177  While state court judges and advocates 
assuredly have the authority to invoke dissents rather than majority 
opinions of the United States Supreme Court in construing their own 
constitutions, heavy reliance on debates about the meaning of a federal 
guarantee are not apt to dignify the state constitutions as independent 
sources of law. 
                                                     
 175. See Blocher, supra note 34, at 338 (noting than an interest in independent state 
constitutional interpretation is not “confined to liberals” and need not be justified solely on “outcome 
oriented” grounds); see also Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution 
Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 421 (1996) (“[T]he continuing strength of this movement 
does not derive from a desire to continue, at the state level, the agenda of the Warren-Brennan Court.  
It derives from the aspiration of state court judges to be independent sources of law.”). 
 176. See Brennan, supra note 159, at 491, 495–96. 
 177. See id. at 498–502; see also Blocher, supra note 34, at 337 (“Led by Justice Brennan . . . 
liberals urged state courts to ‘step into the breach’ left by the Burger Court’s ‘contraction of federal 
rights and remedies on grounds of federalism.’” (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights 
and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 535, 548 (1986))); Shepard, supra note 175, at 422 (suggesting that after “Justice Brennan 
began to find himself on the losing end of [individual rights] cases,” he “candidly announced that the 
war should be waged on another front”). 
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The Brennan article thus helped advance state constitutional law in 
one sense: by reminding advocates, through a prominent Supreme Court 
Justice, that once-forgotten state constitutional protections remain on the 
books and that they provide an alternative theory for relief.  But in a state 
constitutional law equivalent of Stockholm syndrome, the article may 
have advanced the unfortunate myth that federal constitutional law 
remains front and center—the first line of inquiry—leaving state 
constitutional law as the quintessential argument of last resort. 
Some say that federal claims should be resolved first in cases 
presenting federal and state contentions because state courts cannot 
construe their constitutions to offer less protection than the federal 
guarantee.178  That is wrong.  State courts remain free to construe their 
constitutional guarantees to offer as little protection as they think 
appropriate, and only a constitutional amendment can alter that decision.  
Some state courts have said as much.179  The only thing state courts 
cannot do is ignore the independent federal claim.  It may be true that a 
state constitutional ruling that asks less of the government than existing 
federal constitutional law requires will not impact the parties before the 
court.  But that is not a moot point.  Once a state court establishes the 
interrelation between the two guarantees, it has established that no state 
constitutional inquiry is needed, a not-unhelpful development for future 
litigants and courts. 
That also is a not-insignificant development for the United States 
Supreme Court, as it manages and assesses decisions of its own.  Some 
state court rulings directly implicate the meaning of a federal guarantee, 
such as the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
punishment.”180  And some state court rulings may help to inform the 
original meaning of language in the Federal Constitution that first 
appeared in the state constitutions or may provide pragmatic reasons for 
following or steering clear of an approach embraced by the states.181  
Why live in a “top-down constitutional world” when we have the option 
                                                     
 178. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 117 (Pa. 2008); State v. Colosimo, 669 
N.W.2d 1, 10 n.2 (Minn. 2003); State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Iowa 2000). 
 179. See e.g., State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Or. 1983) (“A state’s view of its own 
guarantee may indeed be less stringent, in which case the state remains bound to whatever is the 
contemporary federal rule.”). 
 180. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 
(2002); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330–31 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 
(1989); Blocher, supra note 34, at 378. 
 181. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 n.6, 583 n.7, 584–86, 590 n.13 
(2008); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 
U.S. 43 (1897); Blocher, supra note 34, at 371, 382. 
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of allowing the states to be the “vanguard—the first ones to decide 
whether to embrace or reject innovative legal claims”—and allowing the 
United States Supreme Court, informed by these experiences, to decide 
whether to federalize the issue.182  In a process that Professor Blocher 
calls “reverse incorporation,” the United States Supreme Court remains 
free, whether on pragmatic or originalist grounds, to learn from and, if 
appropriate, borrow from the states’ experiences.183 
Perhaps some fear confusion in the bar if the state courts de-link the 
two constitutional inquiries.  After all, the United States Supreme Court’s 
multi-decade experiment with dueling standards for Bill of Rights 
guarantees applicable to the state and federal governments did not end 
well, as the Court ultimately collapsed the two.184  But is confusion really 
a problem for a single state?  If the state courts treat the two guarantees 
as distinct, the bench, bar, law enforcement, and citizenry still will have 
to pay attention to just one standard: the more far-reaching of the two. 
In the final analysis, there assuredly are historical and practical 
explanations for linking the meaning of federal and state guarantees and 
for prioritizing consideration of the federal ones.  But continuing to do so 
in 2011 as a matter of course is increasingly difficult to justify and, 
worse, all the more likely to deepen the inertia-driven groove that already 
exists.185 
VI. CONCLUSION 
To the credit of the Kansas Law Review, this symposium brings much-
needed attention to a chronically underappreciated subject: the role of the 
constitutions of the fifty states in American constitutionalism.  An emphasis 
on federal constitutional law in the law schools, the academic literature, and 
the private bar may be an understandable, perhaps even desirable, feature of 
                                                     
 182. Sutton, supra note 3, at 176. 
 183. Blocher, supra note 34, at 347–49; see also Joseph Blocher, What State Constitutional Law 
Can Tell Us About the Federal Constitution, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing 
that “state doctrine[s] may be used as persuasive authority in federal cases” but may also be used “to 
define federal law”).  Professor Blocher notes that in Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court “explicitly 
relied on the states’ independent embrace of the exclusionary rule” in deciding to incorporate it 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Blocher, supra note 34, at 372; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643, 651–52 (1961). 
 184. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655–57. 
 185. Cf. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 241–42 (2d ed. 1954) (“[A]fter [administrative 
agencies] have proceeded a while they get their own sets of precedents . . . and they fall into 
grooves, just as the judges do.  When they get into grooves, then God save you to get them out of the 
grooves.”). 
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twenty-first century American law.  But the all-too-frequent neglect of state 
constitutional law in these settings is not, unless one believes that lawyers 
should specialize in being half-equipped to handle constitutional matters on 
behalf of their clients. 
In considering why state constitutional law is taken less seriously than it 
should be, this Essay attempts to burst some bubbles and deflate a few 
others.  Yes, the amendment procedures and judicial elections that prevail in 
most states present marked contrasts with their federal counterparts.  Yes, 
the distinction helps to explain, even sustain, the critique that the state courts 
frequently err on the majoritarian side of the countermajoritarian dilemma.  
And yes, the prolixity of the state constitutions and the frequent linkage of 
them to the meaning of their federal counterpart diminishes the gravity of 
state constitutionalism.  Yet the complexity of these issues and the 
remarkable diversity of state approaches to them underscore the perils of 
dismissing state constitutional law on these grounds.  After more than 200 
years of experience, it is difficult to say that a consensus has emerged on the 
most challenging of these topics—how to select judges and how to amend 
constitutions—for each of this country’s sovereigns, suggesting that the 
nation may be better off embracing fifty-one imperfect, ever-changing 
answers to these questions rather than just one.  Through it all, American 
constitutionalism surely will profit from a healthy dialogue between the two 
systems, one spurred on by this welcome symposium. 
